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Abstract—Classification-as-a-Service (CaaS) is widely deployed
today in machine intelligence stacks for a vastly diverse set of
applications including anything from medical prognosis to com-
puter vision tasks to natural language processing to identity fraud
detection. The compute power required for training complex
models on large datasets to solve these problems can be very
resource-intensive. The CaaS model may cheat by fraudulently
bypassing expensive training procedures in favor of weaker,
less computationally-intensive algorithms which yield results of
reduced quality. Our work addresses the following questions,
given a classification service supplier S, intermediary CaaS
provider P claiming to use S as a classification backend, and
client C: (i) how can P ’s claim to be using S be verified by
C? (ii) how might S make performance guarantees that may be
verified by C? and (iii) how might one design a decentralized
system that incentivizes service proofing and accountability? To
this end, we propose a variety of methods for C to evaluate
the service claims made by P using probabilistic performance
metrics, instance seeding, and steganography. We also propose a
method of measuring the robustness of a model using a blackbox
adversarial procedure, which may then be used as a benchmark
or comparison to a claim made by S. Finally, we propose
the design of a smart contract-based decentralized system that
incentivizes service accountability to serve as a trusted Quality
of Service (QoS) auditor.
Index Terms—Machine Learning, Cloud Computing, Cloud
SLA, Blockchain, Smart contracts, Hyperledger
I. INTRODUCTION
The market for Machine Learning as as Service (MLaaS)
has been exploding recently1, with breakthroughs in tech-
niques, availability of datasets, demand for machine-
intelligence solutions, and power of computation rapidly in-
creasing. With this, we’ve seen a massive demand for resources
to support such computation, and these resources aren’t cheap.
Indeed, much of machine learning commercialized today relies
on deep learning models trained and ran on large GPU clusters,
requiring a great deal of time, energy, and memory to train.
From a business perspective, it is optimal for the service
entity to minimize costs while maximizing revenue. However,
when considering ways to minimize costs, a Classification-
as-a-Service (CaaS) supplier may be tempted to cheat by
delivering cheaper services, classifications made by less
computationally-intensive models, while charging for and
promising classification services performed by better models
that require greater resources. A classification service supplier
1https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/deep-learning-
market-107369271.html
Fig. 1. A trusted intermediary P queries the promised supplier S when a
request from C is received.
exposes an API that takes as input an image and responds with
a softmax probability distribution over the possible labels. The
supplier claims to be using a deep neural network model with
hundreds of layers trained on Tencent ML-Images2 but instead
uses a Support Vector Machine (SVM) model trained on Cifar-
103. SVMs are typically less computationally intensive than
deep learning models, but also often do not perform as well,
especially on computer vision tasks. The overall effect is
a sub-standard level of quality, where the service accuracy,
efficiency, speed, and/or robustness is below the standard set
by the Service Level Agreements (SLA) guarantees or QoS
claims that a CaaS provider makes.
Likewise, intermediary providers claiming to use a high-
quality, but expensive, service as the classification backend
may be tempted to instead use a cheaper or homegrown
classification service. For example, Google’s Bidirectional En-
coder Representations from Transformers (BERT) [1] model
for natural language processing (NLP) is used as a pretraining
procedure, generating 768-dimensional embeddings for input
text. Predictions using these high-dimensional embeddings
are often of high quality, but can be more expensive to
generate and train with. A classification provider claims to use
BERT via Google’s NLP API in the backend for pretraining
to classify input text, but instead uses a homegrown model
to generate 50-dimensional embeddings. The classifications
resulting from models with this pretraining procedure will
likely be of sub-standard quality.
The aim of this paper is to define these and similar problems
that may arise more formally and to propose methods that
address each of them.
2https://github.com/Tencent/tencent-ml-images
3https://www.cs.toronto.edu/ kriz/cifar.html
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Fig. 2. An untrusted, cheating intermediary P does not query the promised
supplier S when a request from C is received, possibly returning cheaper
classification results.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
We define a classification service supplier S to be a service
entity that exposes an API that uses a model M that, when
trained, computes a function Mt : X → Yˆ which takes as
input an input object x ∈ X (e.g., a sequence of DNA, an
image, a sequence of text, an identity graph) and returns as
output a classification vector yˆ ∈ Yˆ , in which yˆi corresponds
to the model’s probability estimate of x being an instance of
object class i, which is described by the ground truth label
vector y. We define a classification service provider P to be
an intermediary entity that takes as input a classification query
x, performs some process, and returns as output a probability
vector yˆ. If P makes an accurate claim to be sourcing classi-
fication service from S, then the process performed would
be sending x along to S and defining yˆ to be the output
received from S. For now, we put aside scenarios where some
transformation is applied by P to the input or output, as these
would likely require case-by-case solutions. Finally, we define
a client C to be an entity with an object x that it wants a
classification vector yˆ for.
There are many scenarios in which validating the QoS of a
classification service supplier or provider becomes important.
For the following scenarios, assume M is untrained.
Scenario 1: S trusted, P untrusted, M blackbox
In this scenario, C requests classification y of object x
from P , who in turn claims to use a service S as a
classification backend. C also does not have access to M .
However, we consider several scenarios here with different
types of interaction with S. One scenario we consider is
one where M is capable of steganography and C can in
turn perform reasonable computations on its own. Another
scenario is where C has the ability to interact directly with
S and an instance of M . This again may be broken into two
scenarios, one where some modifications or features M may
be added, and one where that is not the case. A final scenario
is one where S quality-proofs y by accompanying the output
with metadata, such as a certificate or explanation of the
classification.
Scenario 2: S trusted, P untrusted, M whitebox
Here, C again requests classification y of object x from P ,
but this time, the model is known. We now split this into
two scenarios. In the first, we assume that Mt is reasonably
computable by C. In the second, we assume that Mt is not
reasonably computable by C, but that a decentralized system
may compute it and communicate with C.
Scenario 3: S untrusted, M blackbox
Now we consider a scenario in which S makes a performance
guarantee, but is untrusted. Hence, C (which may be P ,
in this case) must be able to verify these performance
guarantees. In this scenario, M is unknown, and we consider
performance metrics of accuracy, robustness, and latency. In
particular, we’re concerned with the absolute metrics as well
as their consistency with respect to C.
III. RELATED WORK
Machine Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS) is a subset of
cloud computing, for which Service Level Agreements and
Quality of Service measures have been well-studied. The
authors of [2] have proposed a framework for considering
the technological, legal, consumer-adoption, and infrastructure
security problems that arise in cloud computing, proposing that
these issues necessitate research into topics such as optimal
risk transfer and SLA contract design. We take this as a
call-to-action, as we feel that SLAs for MLaaS applications
can be better designed with respect to the possibility of
intermediary fraud. The authors of [3] define web service
level agreements formally with three entities: parties, which
describe the service provider, the service consumer, and third
parties; SLA parameters, which describe resource metrics and
composite metrics, which provide insightful and contextual
information where raw resource metrics fall short, and Service
Level Objectives (SLOs), which are a set of formal if: then
expressions. We acknowledge the necessity for this formal,
deterministic language in our context as well when it is
applicable, but also note that in some cases where only
probabilistic measures are available for QoS, the SLAs which
address these must be more expressive to accommodate. We
also note that, for instance, Google’s ML Engine SLA only
covers metrics such as uptime, and not metrics related to
model accuracy or robustness4. Our work seeks to identify
methods for determining whether some promise in a MLaaS
provider’s SLA or other guarantee mechanism is fraudulent.
The first method we describe uses the ideas of steganography
in the deep learning domain, proposed by [4], to embed hidden
messages into an input request that a supplier would correctly
identify while a fraudulent provider would not be able to
identify it. This work draws inspiration from steganographic
methods for images that do not necessarily involve deep
neural networks [5] as well as autoencoders for dimensionality
reduction [6] to propose a deep neural network architecture
that embeds a message image into a cover image such that
the message image is not visible to a human eye, and can
be extracted by a separate component of the network. Where
supplier services offer explanations with their predictions,
4https://cloud.google.com/ml-engine/sla
we propose the use of explainability rating for our service
access framework. The author of [7] gives a clear overview
of the challenges and current approaches to explainability and
interpretability in machine learning, which we use. Supplier
services also have limitations when it comes to robustness,
and these limitations can be indicative of the robustness
quality of the service provided. To study this, we reference
the approach proposed in [8] to generate adversarial examples
with respect to different classes offered for classification by the
supplier. In these models, we also utilize seeding capabilities
offered by many machine learning libraries and frameworks
such as Tensorflow [9], PyTorch [10], and Caffe [11]. These
seeding methods allow for reproducibility, giving the client or
a federated accountability entity the ability to verify claims
being made by MLaaS providers. In proposing a federated
accountability entity, we build on the work by the authors of
[12] and [13]—we conjecture that a permissioned blockchain
with peers which verify model outputs and reach consensus on
the validity of the output of a provider is a well-suited model
for a federated accountability entity.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
In this section, we present an overview of our solutions to
the scenarios described in II.
A. Watermarking, Seeding, Benchmarking, and Explainability
In Scenario 1, we considered the case where the CaaS
supplier S is trusted, but P is untrusted. Likewise, the
supplier’s model M is blackbox; that is, the model’s
architecture and hyperparameters are unknown. Within this
scenarios, we identified several sub-scenarios that will allow
for solutions involving different techniques and approaches.
1) Deep Steganography: For our first sub-scenario, we
consider the case where S employs a model that supports
deep steganography. Steganography, a term that dates back to
14995, is the practice of concealing a message using a medium.
Examples of steganographic messages are those written on
envelopes in the area covered by postage stamps, or those
written within the lowest bits of noisy images. Unfortunately,
typical algorithmic steganography techniques fail here, since
any steganographic protocol introduced by S intended to be
made known to C is also known by P . In order to address this,
we build on a body of work on deep stegangraphy proposed
by Shumeet Baluja in [4]. In this model, which takes an ap-
proach similar to auto-encoding networks, the hidden message
is nearly impossible to detect and decode without explicit
knowledge of the trained revealing/classification model Mt.
An outline of the procedure is as follows:
1) S creates a steganographic service that takes as input x
and returns as output yˆi, where yˆ1, . . . , yˆn are classifi-
cation probabilities for n object classes, and yˆn+1 is the
classification probability for the message class.
5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography
2) S defines a procedure for creating a model m that will
take as input an instance of any object class and return as
output an instance of the message class that “looks” like
the original object class—that is, P would not classify
it as the message class with high probability. This
procedure can be likened to the generative adversarial
models described by Goodfellow et al. in [8].
3) C leverages m to generate instances of steganographic
objects and queries P with some random sequence of
steganographic objects and nonsteganographic objects.
4) If the classification results yˆ for the steganographic
objects are mostly correct, it may be deemed that P
is likely not fraudulent in its claim. However, if the
classification results yˆ for the steganographic objects
are mostly incorrect, it may be deemed that P is likely
fraudulent and not using S.
The deep steganography model shown in 4 has three compo-
nents, though they are trained as one model: the prep network,
the hiding network, and the revealing network, which performs
classification.
The prep network is responsible for distributing the bits of
the message class instance among the object class instance,
or “cover”, as well as efficiently encoding the message class
instance. The hiding network takes as input the output of the
prep network, which is the message class instance, processed
for embedding into the cover, as well as the cover itself. This
network outputs an instance of a “container” which is the
desired steganographic object. C is responsible for providing
a cover and message, as well as running these two networks.
The reveal network is run by S and takes as input the hiding
network and decodes it to reveal the hidden message. The
overall model implements the loss function
L(c, c′, s, s′) = ||c− c′||+ β||s− s′||,
where c is the cover instance, c′ is the container instance, s
is the secret message, s′ is the reconstructed message, and
β is a hyperparameter used to weigh reconstruction errors.
Intuitively, this penalizes large distances between the input
cover and the container instances, as well as large distances
between the secret message and the reconstruction. Ln-norm
loss functions for different choices of n could be used as well.
As these networks are trained as one model, S is intended to
instantiate and train the full model and publicly release the
prep network and hiding network for use by C, as well as
instances of the message class (which could conceivably be
extended to multiple classes). In describing this procedure,
we’ve assumed that generating a cheaper model that is not
Mt and that can discriminate between inputs of the message
class and object class is not viable.
2) Deterministic Benchmarking: For this sub-scenario, we
consider the case where S makes use of seeding. A seed
is a number or vector used to initialize a pseudorandom
number generator. Hence, any pseudostochastic process (such
as stochastic gradient descent) or pseudorandom generation
Fig. 3. We propose as a solution a set of five main methods described in section III.
Fig. 4. The flow of our proposed steganography-based MLaaS accountability
testing method.
(such as weight initialization) used in machine learning models
can be made reproducible by seeding. As a result, we propose
that a supplier S make available the seed configuration used
to initialize M for any provider P , so that a client C can
initialize another instance directly with S using the same seed
configuration and compare (x, yˆ) pairs yielded from P and
S. We have determinism due to seeding, so if each pair is
identical, we can say with high probability that P is not
fraudulent. On the other hand, if any pair is not identical,
we can say that P is fraudulent.
3) Probabilistic Benchmarking: Now we consider the
case where S, while trusted, has a strictly blackbox model.
Because we’re unable to compare (x, y) pairs exactly, we
must settle for a more probabilistic approach of performance
benchmarking. As an example, we consider accuracy as the
performance metric under scrutiny. C prepares k pairs of
identical inputs (xi, xi) for which it has ground truth labels,
sends P and S each one of each x, retrieves the outputs
(y1i , y2i), and calculates the overall accuracy for each model.
If P is shown to have lower accuracy than S (this may be
evaluated with variance in mind, which is controlled by k), it
is likely that P is fraudulent. If they show roughly the same
accuracy (again considered with respect to the size of k),
then it’s likely that P is not fraudulent.
4) Metaresults: Finally, we consider the case where S may
provide information along with the results of a classification,
such as an explanation of the results or a “quality assurance”
key that may be used to verify a classification event with S.
In this case, C would need to know of the quality assurance
measures taken by S in order to take advantage of them. This
being the case, it would be very difficult for an untrusted
provider P to forge the metaresults returned from a verified
classification event with S. Likewise if P indeed queried
S, all it would need to do is pass the metaresults along to
C. This method is predicated on the assumption that it is
difficult for any provider P without access to Mt to create
valid metaresults.
B. Accountability with Known M
Let’s now consider the scenario in which M is a whitebox
model. That is, S has made publicly known the architecture,
hyperparameters, and training procedure. Here, we have two
subscenarios. In the first, we assume that Mt is also available
or reasonably computable by C. In this case, note that C can
use the performance metric comparison method described in
IV-A3 by instantiating its own Mt and comparing the metrics
given by identical trials run with P and its own model.
On the other hand, we consider a scenario in which Mt is
not available or reasonably computable by C. This particular
scenario is one of the more common scenarios in today’s
CaaS market, along with blackbox scenarios, as the service
suppiers often release research papers and open-source code
detailing their work. Here, we introduce a decentralized system
that functions as a trusted QoS auditor. The QoS auditor is a
blockchain-based model with peers being CaaS accounters,
Fig. 5. An outline of a decentralized MLaaS service accountability system
based on the permissioned blockchain model.
which are oracles who compute M and post transactions
with data including performance metrics of the model and
performance metrics of S. Majority consensus mechanisms
here are designed to ensure that accurate performance metrics
of a service S are maintained on-chain. Clients who desire
a verification of a model M send requests with tokens to
the chain to receive verified performance metrics on M , and
oracles that cast votes on performance metrics of M which are
in the majority are rewarded with tokens. The blockchain is not
open to the public, since the services provided to the client are
more valuable than the tokens the client pays for verification.
Hence, view access would be managed by a trusted gatekeeper.
An assumption we make here is that the oracles are trusted
and/or mutually untrusting, and would therefore not collude
to cheat the system.
C. Benchmarking Performance Claims of Untrusted S
Robustness is a desirable characteristic in classification
models. Recent work by Ian Goodfellow and others ex-
plores the methods and implications of real world and
computationally-generated adversarial examples against black-
box models, such as M [14][15]. These models take advantage
of the fact that the function Mt is differentiable and by
studying the gradient with respect to the input, the output
can be controlled in some sense. The canonical multilayer
perceptron example from Goodfellow’s 2014 paper between
an adversarial network and a discriminator network illustrates
this. Suppose G is a differentiable function that represents
the generator multilayer perceptron. In particular, if θg is the
set of model parameters for G, pz(z) is the prior probability
distribution of the input z, then let G(z, θg) map to the data
space X , described by a multilayer perceptron. This model
wants to learn the generated distribution, pg , over the data.
Now, if θd is the set of model parameters for D and x ∈ X ,
let D map to the space of real scalars, and note that D
is also described by a multilayer perceptron. Then D(x, θd)
represents the probability that x came from the data, and not
pg . We then formulate the minimax game to represent the
objective, with respect to the value function V (G,D), where
pt is the true probability distribution of the data:
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) =Ex∼pt(x)[logD(x)]
+ Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))].
Fig. 6. A visual representation of the process by which adversarial inputs are
generated.
For our purposes, we are n concerned only with a dynamic
generator model, where the discriminator model does not
respond to adversarial adaptation. Hence, we want
argmax
G
(
Ex∼pt [1−D(x)] + Ex∼pg [D(x)]
)
.
where the sum being maximized is the expected absolute error
of the discriminator. To illustrate the idea behind generative
adversarial models for a robustness metric, consider figure 6.
Here, M is a binary classification model that is tasked with
assigning probabilities of an input example being labeled as
“cheetah” (class 1) or “mouse” (class 2). The model correctly
predicts the label of “cheetah” for the input example above.
However, we introduce an adversarial model for M , AM ,
which uses the gradient of the outputs of Mt to generate
an additive transformation (seen in the center panel) which,
when applied to the input, yields an output that is classified
as “mouse” with high probability, though this adversarial ex-
ample is clearly, to the human eye, still depicting a cheetah. To
establish a measure of robustness, we concern ourselves with
the gradient of convergence to a certain robustness threshold
given an input image that is uniformly sampled from the space
of all input images. For a simple guarantee metric here, we
look at the average number of input queries the adversarial
model needs to make to the blackbox model before we reach a
certain classification probability for class i, from a uniformly
sampled image. In the figure 7, we see that an adversarial
model has generated an example that has passed the robustness
threshold for class 2.
In this scenario, S may release the architecture for an
adversarial model AM , as well as a robustness score (perhaps a
sigmoidal function of the average number of examples needed
for AM to generate before reaching a certain robustness
threshold) for each class that the service offers classification
for. This need not be limited to images, but can be extended
to any type of input.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we’ve examined the problem of Machine
Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS) accountability and have pro-
posed a suite of accountability methods that may be used to
Fig. 7. One way of testing the robustness of a classification service is to
study the gradient of the outputs during adversarial training, with respect to
each class.
verify the Quality of Service (QoS) guaranteed by a MLaaS
provider in their Service Level Agreements (SLAs) or other-
wise. These methods build upon techniques in deep steganog-
raphy, seeding for reproducibility in models, explainability in
artificial intelligence (XAI), generative adversarial models for
robustness measurements, and permissioned blockchains for
federated accountability entities. With these methods, a client
will be able to determine a probability of whether a MLaaS
provider is cheating, and MLaaS providers will be able to use
these methods to create improved SLAs that reflect respective
verifiable QoS measures.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Devlin, M. Chang, K. Lee, and K. Toutanova, “BERT: pre-training
of deep bidirectional transformers for language understanding,” CoRR,
vol. abs/1810.04805, 2018. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/
1810.04805
[2] S. Marston, Z. Li, S. Bandyopadhyay, J. Zhang, and A. Ghalsasi, “Cloud
computingthe business perspective,” Decision support systems, vol. 51,
no. 1, pp. 176–189, 2011.
[3] H. Ludwig, A. Keller, A. Dan, R. P. King, and R. Franck, “Web service
level agreement (wsla) language specification,” Ibm corporation, pp.
815–824, 2003.
[4] S. Baluja, “Hiding images in plain sight: Deep steganography,”
in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30,
I. Guyon, U. V. Luxburg, S. Bengio, H. Wallach, R. Fergus,
S. Vishwanathan, and R. Garnett, Eds. Curran Associates, Inc.,
2017, pp. 2069–2079. [Online]. Available: http://papers.nips.cc/paper/
6802-hiding-images-in-plain-sight-deep-steganography.pdf
[5] T. Morkel, J. H. Eloff, and M. S. Olivier, “An overview of image
steganography.” in ISSA, 2005, pp. 1–11.
[6] G. E. Hinton and R. R. Salakhutdinov, “Reducing the dimensionality of
data with neural networks,” science, vol. 313, no. 5786, pp. 504–507,
2006.
[7] D. Gunning, “Explainable artificial intelligence (xai),” Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), nd Web, vol. 2, 2017.
[8] I. Goodfellow, J. Pouget-Abadie, M. Mirza, B. Xu, D. Warde-Farley,
S. Ozair, A. Courville, and Y. Bengio, “Generative adversarial nets,” in
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 27, Z. Ghahramani,
M. Welling, C. Cortes, N. D. Lawrence, and K. Q. Weinberger, Eds.
Curran Associates, Inc., 2014, pp. 2672–2680. [Online]. Available:
http://papers.nips.cc/paper/5423-generative-adversarial-nets.pdf
[9] M. Abadi, P. Barham, J. Chen, Z. Chen, A. Davis, J. Dean, M. Devin,
S. Ghemawat, G. Irving, M. Isard et al., “Tensorflow: A system for large-
scale machine learning,” in 12th {USENIX} Symposium on Operating
Systems Design and Implementation ({OSDI} 16), 2016, pp. 265–283.
[10] A. Paszke, S. Gross, S. Chintala, G. Chanan, E. Yang, Z. DeVito, Z. Lin,
A. Desmaison, L. Antiga, and A. Lerer, “Automatic differentiation in
pytorch,” 2017.
[11] Y. Jia, E. Shelhamer, J. Donahue, S. Karayev, J. Long, R. Girshick,
S. Guadarrama, and T. Darrell, “Caffe: Convolutional architecture for
fast feature embedding,” in Proceedings of the 22nd ACM international
conference on Multimedia. ACM, 2014, pp. 675–678.
[12] E. Androulaki, A. Barger, V. Bortnikov, C. Cachin, K. Christidis,
A. De Caro, D. Enyeart, C. Ferris, G. Laventman, Y. Manevich et al.,
“Hyperledger fabric: a distributed operating system for permissioned
blockchains,” in Proceedings of the Thirteenth EuroSys Conference.
ACM, 2018, p. 30.
[13] C. Cachin, “Architecture of the hyperledger blockchain fabric,” in
Workshop on distributed cryptocurrencies and consensus ledgers, vol.
310, 2016, p. 4.
[14] N. Papernot, P. D. McDaniel, I. J. Goodfellow, S. Jha, Z. B. Celik,
and A. Swami, “Practical black-box attacks against deep learning
systems using adversarial examples,” CoRR, vol. abs/1602.02697, 2016.
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.02697
[15] A. Kurakin, I. J. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio, “Adversarial examples
in the physical world,” CoRR, vol. abs/1607.02533, 2016. [Online].
Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1607.02533
